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Abstract
We consider the problem of allocating several units of an indivisible
object among the agents with single-peaked and risk-averse utility
functions. We introduce equal probability for the best, and show that
the randomized uniform rule is the only randomized rule satisfying
strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality, and equal probability for the
best. This is an alternative characterization of the result of Ehlers
and Klaus (2004).
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1 Introduction
We consider the situation where the manager of a firm allocates several re-
cruited workers to some departments such as sales, production, and so on.
Each department has an optimal number of workers, because if the depart-
ment has fewer workers than the number, it cannot accomplish its task, and
if it has more, it needs extra equipment and incurs additional training costs.
The above mentioned problem faced by the manager is an example of
the problem of allocating several units of an indivisible and identical ob-
ject among a finite group of agents with single-peaked, risk-averse, and von-
Neumann and Morgenstern utility functions. In this paper, we analyze the
problem axiomatically, which was initiated by Sasaki (1997).
When the objects are infinitely divisible, a deterministic rule known as the
uniform rule is a solution to the above problem in the sense that it satisfies
strategy-proofness, efficiency, and some kind of fairness (Benassy (1982),
Sprumont (1991), and Ching (1994)). The uniform rule works as follows:
each agent is allowed to choose his/her own peak subject to a common bound
which is chosen so as to attain feasibility.
However, the uniform rule cannot be applied to the problem where the
objects are not infinitely divisible but indivisible because the common bound
that the uniform rule allocates can be a fraction. In order to deal with the
difficulty due to indivisibility, we use not deterministic rules but randomized
rules, which associate with each profile of the utility functions a probability
distribution on feasible allocations. Another justification for considering ran-
domized rules rather than deterministic rules is that it is the simplest way
to ensure fairness when the objects are indivisible.
As we consider a probabilistic extension of rules, it is reasonable to con-
sider a probabilistic extension of the uniform rule, which we call the ran-
domized uniform rule. The randomized uniform rule is a randomized rule
which outputs a probability distribution that has the following marginal dis-
tribution: the agent who gets his/her own peak under the uniform rule gets
his/her own peak with probability 1, and the rest of the agents get the
common bound rounded up and that rounded down with the common prob-
abilities which are chosen so as to equate the expected value of each agent
to the common bound.
Sasaki (1997) first considered the randomized extension of the uniform
rule. He introduced an equal probability uniform rule, which is a special
case of the randomized uniform rule, and showed that it satisfies strategy-
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proofness, Pareto optimality, and anonymity. He also pointed out the impor-
tance of risk-averseness of the utility functions. If risk-loving von-Neumann
and Morgenstern utility functions are allowed, the randomized uniform rule
does not satisfy Pareto optimality.
In this paper, we characterize the randomized uniform rule by strategy-
proofness, Pareto optimality, and equal probability for the best. Equal prob-
ability for the best is the axiom relating to fairness. Given an agent and
a probability distribution, let us call the number of the object which gives
him/her the highest utility with a strictly positive probability the best for
the agent. Then, equal probability for the best requires the randomized rules
to output the probability distribution which has the following marginal dis-
tribution: if two agents have the same utility function, then they should
get the same best with the same probability. For example, suppose that the
manager has to allocate three recruited workers to two departments, A and
B. Further, we assume that both departments have the same utility function
and want more than three workers, that is, their peaks are three. Let us con-
sider the case in which a randomized rule outputs a probability distribution
which gives department A the marginal distribution that places probability
zero on getting three workers, and probability 1/3 on getting two, one, and
no worker(s) respectively. We can say that getting two workers is the best
for department A in this case. Then, this axiom requires that the probability
distribution should give department B the marginal distribution where get-
ting two workers is the best for it and is placed probability 1/3 on. However,
the probability placed on getting one worker and that on getting no worker
do not need to be equal between the departments.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, our paper is the first
to introduce the axiom relating to fairness that is indigenous to indivisibility
or randomization. The axioms used in previous papers on randomization of
the uniform rule, such as equal treatment of equals, symmetry, anonymity,
and so on, are just the randomized version of those used in the deterministic
environment. However, equal probability for the best has no counterpart in
the deterministic environment. In addition, equal probability for the best is a
weak axiom in the sense that it requires that only a part of the marginal dis-
tribution should be equal between the agents with the same utility function,
whereas some other axioms require the whole part should be.
Second, we succeed in characterizing the randomized uniform rule by
strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality, and equal probability for the best.
This result is an alternative characterization of Ehlers and Klaus’ (2004).
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They succeeded in characterizing the randomized uniform rule by strategy-
proofness, Pareto optimality, and equal treatment of equals. This implies
that in the presence of strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality, equal prob-
ability for the best and equal treatment of equals are identical, whereas equal
probability for the best is logically independent of equal treatment of equals.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Several
axioms and the randomized uniform rule are introduced, and our theorem is
presented in Section 3. The proof of our theorem is similar to that of Ching
(1994).
2 The Model
We consider the problem of allocating several units X ∈ Z++ of an indivisible
object among a finite group of agents, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The objects are
identical. We denote the set of the indivisible objects by C = {0, 1, 2, . . . , X}.
Each agent i ∈ N has a von-Neumann and Morgenstern utility function
ui : C → R which is single-peaked and risk-averse. ui is single-peaked if there
is a unique peak p(ui) ∈ C such that for all k, k′ ∈ C with p(ui) ≤ k < k′
or k′ < k ≤ p(ui), ui(p(ui)) ≥ ui(k) > ui(k′). ui is risk-averse if for any
k ∈ C\{0, X}, ui(k) − ui(k − 1) > ui(k + 1) − ui(k). We assume that the
utility functions are only privately known. Let U be the set of all single-
peaked, risk-averse, and von-Neumann and Morgenstern utility functions.
u = (u1, u2, . . . , un) ∈ Un is called a profile of the utility functions. u−i
stands for (u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , un) ∈ Un−1. (N, u,X) is called a prob-
lem. We say that the problem is in excess demand if
∑
i∈N p(ui) ≥ X. If∑
i∈N p(ui) < X, the problem is in excess supply. A feasible allocation is a
vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Cn with
∑
i∈N xi = X.
1 Let A(X) be the set
of all feasible allocations. f is a probability distribution on A(X) such that
f : A(X) → [0, 1] and∑x∈A(X) f(x) = 1. Let S(X) be the set of all probabil-
ity distributions on A(X). A randomized rule is a function φ : Un → S(X).
We define the probability with which a probability distribution f gives k
units of the indivisible object to agent i by fi(k) ≡
∑
x∈{x∈A(X )|xi=k} f(x).
This means that fi is the marginal distribution of f with respect to the num-
ber of the object that the agent i obtains. Given a probability distribution f ,
we call
∑
k∈C fi(k)ui(k) the expected utility of agent i. We abuse notation,
1Free-disposability is not allowed.
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and write φ(u)(x) as φ(x; u) and φi(u)(k) as φi(k; u).
2
The following example demonstrates that two distinct probability distri-
butions have the same marginal distribution.
Example 1. Let n = 4 and X = 2. Let f = [ 1
6
◦ (1, 1, 0, 0), 1
6
◦ (1, 0, 1, 0), 1
6
◦
(1, 0, 0, 1), 1
6
◦(0, 1, 1, 0), 1
6
◦(0, 1, 0, 1), 1
6
◦(0, 0, 1, 1)] and f ′ = [ 1
2
◦(1, 1, 0, 0), 1
2
◦
(0, 0, 1, 1)]. Both f and f ′ give each agent i the same marginal distribution
fi(k) = f
′
i(k) =
1
2
for k = 0, 1 and fi(2) = f
′
i(2) = 0.
3 Axioms and the Randomized Uniform Rule
We are interested in the following axioms. The first is the requirement that
no agent ever benefits from misrepresenting his/her utility function, which is
only privately known.
Strategy-proofness. For any i ∈ N , any ui, uˆi ∈ U , and any u−i ∈ Un−1,∑
k∈C φi(k; u)ui(k) ≥
∑
k∈C φi(k; uˆi, u−i)ui(k).
A standard axiom that needs no further explanation is Pareto optimality.
Pareto optimality. For any u ∈ Un, there is no f ∈ S(X) such that
for all i ∈ N , ∑k∈C fi(k)ui(k) ≥ ∑k∈C φi(k; u)ui(k) and for some j ∈ N ,∑
k∈C fj(k)uj(k) >
∑
k∈C φj(k; u)uj(k).
Pareto optimality implies same-sidedness, which requires that for any agent
every number of the object which he/she obtains with a strictly positive
probability should be equal to or less (more) than his/her own peak when
the problem is in excess demand (supply).
Same-sidedness. For any u ∈ Un and any i ∈ N ,
(i) when
∑
j∈N p(uj) ≥ X, for all k ∈ C, φi(k; u) > 0 implies k ≤ p(ui), and
(ii) when
∑
j∈N p(uj) < X, for all k ∈ C, φi(k; u) > 0 implies k ≥ p(ui).
Lemma 1. If φ is Pareto optimal, then it is same-sided.
Proof of Lemma 1. See Sasaki (1997). 
For the converse statement of Lemma 1 to be true we need property B, which
is presented in the Appendix.
The final is related to fairness. We call it equal probability for the best. Given
a probability distribution and an agent, there exists a number of the object
2φ(x; u) is the probability which the randomized rule φ places on the feasible allocation
x ∈ A(X) when the reported utility profile is u ∈ Un. φi(k; u) is the probability with which
agent i obtains k units of the object under the randomized rule φ when the reported utility
profile is u.
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which gives him/her the highest utility with a strictly positive probability.
The number is called the best. It should be noted that since every utility
function is single-peaked the agent has at most two bests: one is on the
left side of his/her peak and the other is on the right side. Also note that
each agent has only one best if the randomized rule satisfies same-sidedness.
Then, equal probability for the best requires the randomized rule to output
the probability distribution which has the following marginal distribution: if
two agents have the same utility function, then at least one of the bests and
the corresponding probabilities should be same between the agents. Note that
the marginal distribution of each agent does not need to be same between
the agents.
In order to define equal probability for the best formally, for any i ∈ N
and any f ∈ S(X), we need Bif : the set of all pairs consisting of both the
number of the object which gives agent i the highest utility with a strictly
positive probability and the corresponding probability of the number under
the probability distribution f . Note that Bif is a singleton or a doubleton.
For any probability distribution f ∈ S(X), any i ∈ N , and any ui ∈ U , let
Bif ≡ {(b, fi(b)) ∈ C × (0, 1] | ui(b) ≥ ui(k) for all k ∈ C such that fi(k) >
0}.
Using Bif , equal probability for the best can be represented as follows.
Equal probability for the best. For any u ∈ Un and any i, j ∈ N , if
ui = uj, then B
i
φ(u) ∩ Bjφ(u) 	= ∅.
Equal treatment of equals says that if two agents’ utility functions are same,
their expected utilities should also be same.
Equal treatment of equals. For any u ∈ Un and any i, j ∈ N , if ui = uj,
then
∑
k∈C φi(k)ui(k) =
∑
k∈C φj(k)uj(k).
Remark 1. Both equal probability for the best and equal treatment of equals
are implied by symmetry,3 which is weaker than anonymity.4 It is easy to
check that equal probability for the best and equal treatment of equals are
logically independent.
When objects are infinitely divisible, a well-known deterministic rule sat-
isfying strategy-proofness is the uniform rule (Benassy (1982)). It is the
3For any u ∈ Un and any i, j ∈ N , if ui = uj, then φi(k) = φj(k) for all k ∈ C.
4For any u ∈ Un, any permutation π of N , any i ∈ N , and any k ∈ C, φi(k; uπ) =
φπ(i)(k; u) where uπ = (uπ(1), uπ(2), . . . , uπ(n)) ∈ Un.
5
function Υ : Un → Rn+ such that for any u ∈ Un,
Υj(u) ≡
{
min{p(uj), λ} if
∑
i∈N p(ui) ≥ X,
max{p(uj), λ} otherwise,
for all j ∈ N , where λ ∈ R+ solves
∑
i∈N Υi(u) = X.
We must note that the common bound λ can be a fraction so the uniform
rule cannot be used to solve the problems with the indivisible objects. As
an alternative rule, we propose a probabilistic extension of the uniform rule,
the randomized uniform rule, which is a particular randomized rule.
Definition 1. The randomized uniform rule Φ : Un → S(X) is the function
defined as follows: for any u ∈ Un,
(i) when
∑
i∈N p(ui) ≥ X,

Φj(p(uj); u) = 1 if p(uj) ≤ λ,
Φj(µ + 1;u) = λ− µ
Φj(µ;u) = 1− (λ− µ) if p(uj) > λ,
(ii) when
∑
i∈N p(ui) < X,

Φj(p(uj); u) = 1 if p(uj) ≥ λ,
Φj(µ + 1;u) = λ− µ
Φj(µ;u) = 1− (λ− µ) if p(uj) < λ,
for all j ∈ N , where λ ∈ R+ solves
∑
i∈N
∑
k∈C Φi(k)k = X and µ ≡ λ.56
The randomized uniform rule associates with each profile of the utility func-
tions a probability distribution that induces the marginal distribution of the
following form. When the problem is in excess demand (supply), the agent
whose peak is equal to or less (more) than the common bound λ gets his/her
own peak with probability 1. The rest of the agents get µ+1 with probability
λ− µ and µ with probability 1− λ + µ respectively. µ is obtained through
rounding down the common bound λ.
The randomized uniform rule outputs “a” probability distribution which
induces each agent’s marginal distribution defined as (i) and (ii) of Defini-
tion 1. Hence, the randomized uniform rule uniquely determines a marginal
5For any a ∈ R, let a = n be the integer such that n ≤ a < n+ 1.
6More than one probability distribution can have the marginal distribution defined as
(i) and (ii) of Definition 1, as we pointed out in Example 1. The randomized uniform rule
chooses one of such probability distributions arbitrarily.
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distribution for each agent, but it does not uniquely determine a probability
distribution (although it uniquely chooses a probability distribution) because,
as we pointed out in Example 1, more than one probability distribution can
have an identical marginal distribution.
A special case of the randomized uniform rule is the equal probability
uniform rule.
Example 2. The equal probability uniform rule Ψ : Un → S(X) is defined as
follows: for any u ∈ Un,
(i) Ψi(u) = Φi(u) for any i ∈ N , and
(ii) Ψ(x; u) = Ψ(x′; u) for any x, x′ ∈ A(X) such that Ψ(x; u) > 0 and
Ψ(x′; u) > 0.
The equal probability uniform rule outputs the probability distribution (i)
which has the same marginal distribution as that of the randomized uniform
rule, and (ii) where any feasible allocations each of which is given a strictly
positive probability have an equal probability. Sasaki (1997) introduced a
randomized uniform rule which is a particular equal probability uniform rule,
which uniquely determines not only a marginal distribution for each agent
but also a probability distribution (see Sasaki (1997) for details).
3.1 An Alternative Characterization of the Random-
ized Uniform Rule
The randomized uniform rule can be characterized by strategy-proofness,
Pareto optimality, and equal probability for the best.
Theorem. The randomized uniform rule Φ is the only randomized rule
satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality, and equal probability for
the best.
Proof of the Theorem. Proof of the Theorem is in the Appendix. 
The main feature of this Theorem is that our characterization is conducted
with the axiom, equal probability for the best with respect to the axiom re-
lating to fairness. This axiom is indigenous to indivisibility or randomization
so that it has no counterpart in the deterministic environment. On the other
hand, in previous papers on randomization of the uniform rule, all axioms
on fairness, such as equal treatment of equals, symmetry, anonymity, and so
on, are just the randomized version of those used in the deterministic envi-
ronment. Hence, we can say that our characterization is the first one that is
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not a mere randomized version of the results obtained in the deterministic
environment.
Ehlers and Klaus (2004) showed that the class of the randomized uniform
rules is characterized by Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, and equal
treatment of equals. Hence, by our Theorem we succeed in giving an al-
ternative characterization of Ehlers and Klaus’ (2004). This implies that
in the presence of strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality, equal probabil-
ity for the best and equal treatment of equals are identical, whereas equal
probability for the best is logically independent of equal treatment of equals.
Moreover, by Remark 1 anonymity or symmetry implies equal probability
for the best respectively, and it is obvious that the randomized uniform rule
satisfies anonymity and symmetry. These indicate that equal probability for
the best, equal treatment of equals, symmetry, and anonymity are identical
in the presence of strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality.
8
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Appendix
Before proceeding to prove the Theorem, we need some following lemmas.
Lemma 2 says that Pareto optimality implies property B, which requires
that randomized rules assign the probability distribution where each agent
receives at most two numbers of the object which are adjacent with each
other.
Property B (Sasaki (1997)). For any u ∈ Un and any i ∈ N , there exists
αi ∈ C with φi(αi + 1;u) > 0 such that φi(αi; u) + φi(αi + 1;u) = 1.
Lemma 2 (Sasaki (1997)). If φ satisfies Pareto optimality, then it satisfies
property B.
Proof of Lemma 2. See Sasaki (1997). 
If we assume that φ satisfies same-sidedness, then we can show the con-
verse statement of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. If φ satisfies same-sidedness and property B, then it satisfies
Pareto optimality.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose the contrary. There exists f ∈ S(X) such
that for all i ∈ N , ∑k∈C fi(k)ui(k) ≥ ∑k∈C φi(k; u)ui(k) and for some j ∈
N ,
∑
k∈C fj(k)uj(k) >
∑
k∈C φj(k; u)uj(k). Without loss of generality, we
assume that
∑
i∈N p(ui) ≥ X. Let λi ≡
∑
k∈C fi(k)k and µi ≡ λi for all
i ∈ N . From risk-averseness, we have for all i ∈ N , (1 − λi + µi)ui(µi) +
(λi − µi)ui(µi +1) ≥
∑
k∈C fi(k)ui(k). From property B, for all i ∈ N , there
exists αi ∈ C such that φi(αi; u) + φi(αi + 1;u) = 1. Therefore, we have∑
k∈C φi(k; u)ui(k) = φi(αi; u)ui(αi) + φi(αi + 1;u)ui(αi + 1) for all i ∈ N .
Hence, we have (1 − λi + µi)ui(µi) + (λi − µi)ui(µi + 1) ≥ φi(αi; u)ui(αi) +
φi(αi+1;u)ui(αi+1) for all i 	= j and (1−λj+µj)uj(µj)+(λj−µj)uj(µj+1) >
φj(αj; u)uj(αj) + φj(αj + 1;u)uj(αj + 1).
From same-sidedness, we have for all i ∈ N , p(ui) ≥
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k.
Hence, single-peakedness implies that for all i 	= j, (1 − λi + µi)µi + (λi −
µi)(µi + 1) ≥ φi(αi; u)αi + φi(αi + 1;u)(αi + 1) and (1− λj + µj)µj + (λj −
µj)(µj + 1) > φj(αj; u)αj + φj(αj + 1;u)(αj + 1).
Summing up gives us
∑
i∈N (1 − λi + µi)µi +
∑
i∈N(λi − µi)(µi + 1) >∑
i∈N φi(αi; u)αi +
∑
i∈N φi(αi + 1;u)(αi + 1). The left hand side becomes∑
i∈N λi =
∑
i∈N
∑
k∈C fi(k)k = X. The last equality follows from feasibility.
Moreover, the right hand side also becomes
∑
i∈N
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k = X by
feasibility. This is a contradiction. 
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Property B is the key property in the sense that the problem of allocating
X units of the identical and indivisible object among n individuals with
single-peaked and risk-averse utility functions reduces to that of allocating
X amount of the infinitely divisible object among them, as explained in
Ehlers and Klaus (2004).
The rest closely follows Ching (1994). Lemma 4 says that Pareto optimal-
ity and strategy-proofness imply own peak monotonicity, which requires that
the expected value of the marginal distribution of each agent is monotonic
with respect to his/her reported peak.
Own peak monotonicity. For all i ∈ N , all ui, u′i ∈ U , and all u−i ∈ Un−1,
if p(u′i) ≤ p(ui), then
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)k ≤
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k.
Lemma 4. If φ satisfies Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness, then it is
own peak monotonic.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose the contrary. We have p(u′i) ≤ p(ui) and∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)k >
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k. By property B, there exist αi, α
′
i ∈ C
such that φi(αi; u)+φi(αi+1;u) = 1 and φi(α
′
i; u
′
i, u−i)+φi(α
′
i+1;u
′
i, u−i) = 1.
Hence, we have
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k = φi(αi; u)αi + φi(αi + 1;u)(αi + 1) and∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)k = φi(α
′
i; u
′
i, u−i)α
′
i + φi(α
′
i + 1;u
′
i, u−i)(α
′
i + 1).
If
∑
j∈N p(uj) ≤ X, by same-sidedness, p(ui) ≤
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k. Then,
we have p(u′i) ≤
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k = φi(αi; u)αi + φi(αi + 1;u)(αi + 1) <∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)k = φi(α
′
i; u
′
i, u−i)α
′
i +φi(α
′
i+1;u
′
i, u−i)(α
′
i+1). By single-
peakedness, we have φi(αi; u)u
′
i(αi)+φi(αi+1;u)u
′
i(αi+1) > φi(α
′
i; u
′
i, u−i)u
′
i(α
′
i)+
φi(α
′
i+1;u
′
i, u−i)u
′
i(α
′
i+1). Hence,
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)u
′
i(k) >
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)u
′
i(k),
contradicting strategy-proofness.
If
∑
j∈N p(uj) > X, then for all j ∈ N,
∑
k∈C φj(k; u)k ≤ p(uj). There are
two cases: (i) If
∑
j =i p(uj) + p(u
′
i) ≥ X, then, by same-sidedness, we have∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)k ≤ p(u′i). Then,
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k = φi(αi; u)αi + φi(αi +
1;u)(αi+1) <
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)k = φi(α
′
i; u
′
i, u−i)α
′
i+φi(α
′
i+1;u
′
i, u−i)(α
′
i+
1) ≤ p(u′i) ≤ p(ui). Single-peakedness implies that φi(αi; u)ui(αi) + φi(αi +
1;u)ui(αi+1) < φi(α
′
i; u
′
i, u−i)ui(α
′
i)+φi(α
′
i+1;u
′
i, u−i)ui(α
′
i+1). This means
that
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)ui(k) <
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)ui(k).
(ii) If
∑
j =i p(uj) + p(u
′
i) < X, then p(u
′
i) <
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k (otherwise,
p(u′i) ≥
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k. Since for all j ∈ N, p(uj) ≥
∑
k∈C φj(k; u)k, we
have X =
∑
j∈N
∑
k∈C φj(k; u)k ≤ p(u′i) +
∑
j =i p(uj) < X). Hence, we have
p(u′i) <
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k = φi(αi; u)αi+φi(αi+1;u)(αi+1) <
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)k =
φi(α
′
i; u
′
i, u−i)α
′
i+φi(α
′
i+1;u
′
i, u−i)(α
′
i+1). Single-peakedness implies φi(αi; u)u
′
i(αi)+
φi(αi + 1;u)u
′
i(αi + 1) > φi(α
′
i; u
′
i, u−i)u
′
i(α
′
i) + φi(α
′
i + 1;u
′
i, u−i)u
′
i(α
′
i + 1).
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This implies that
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)u
′
i(k) >
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)u
′
i(k).
In both cases, we obtain a contradiction to strategy-proofness. 
Uncompromisingness requires that given u−i, the expected value of agent i’s
marginal distribution does not change if his/her initial peak is less (more)
than his/her initial expected value and his/her new peak is equal to or less
(more) than his/her initial expected value. Lemma 5 shows that Pareto
optimality and strategy-proofness imply uncompromisingness.
Uncompromisingness. For all i ∈ N , all ui, u′i ∈ U , and all u−i ∈
Un−1, if [p(ui) <
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k and p(u
′
i) ≤
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k] or [p(ui) >∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k and p(u
′
i) ≥
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k], then
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k =
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)k.
Lemma 5. If φ satisfies Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness, then it is
uncompromising.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose the contrary. Then, [p(ui) <
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k and
p(u′i) ≤
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k] or [p(ui) >
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k and p(u
′
i) ≥
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k]
and
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k 	=
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)k. Without loss of generality, we
assume that p(ui) <
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k and p(u
′
i) ≤
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k. By prop-
erty B, there exist αi, α
′
i ∈ C such that φi(αi; u) + φi(αi + 1;u) = 1 and
φi(α
′
i; u
′
i, u−i) + φi(α
′
i + 1;u
′
i, u−i) = 1. Hence, we have
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k =
φi(αi; u)αi+φi(αi+1;u)(αi+1) and
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)k = φi(α
′
i; u
′
i, u−i)α
′
i+
φi(α
′
i + 1;u
′
i, u−i)(α
′
i + 1).
There are two cases: (i) If
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k <
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)k, then
p(u′i) ≤ φi(αi; u)αi + φi(αi + 1;u)(αi + 1) < φi(α′i; u′i, u−i)α′i + φi(α′i +
1;u′i, u−i)(α
′
i + 1). Single-peakedness implies that φi(αi; u)u
′
i(αi) + φi(αi +
1;u)u′i(αi+1) > φi(α
′
i; u
′
i, u−i)u
′
i(α
′
i)+φi(α
′
i+1;u
′
i, u−i)u
′
i(α
′
i+1). This implies
that
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)u
′
i(k) >
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)u
′
i(k). (ii) If
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k >∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)k, let u
′′
i ∈ U be such that p(u′′i ) = p(ui) and φi(α′i; u′i, u−i)u′′i (α′i)+
φi(α
′
i+1;u
′
i, u−i)u
′′
i (α
′
i+1) > φi(αi; u)u
′′
i (αi)+φi(αi+1;u)u
′′
i (αi+1). By prop-
erty B, there exists α′′i ∈ C such that φi(α′′i ; u′′i , u−i)+φi(α′′i +1;u′′i , u−i) = 1.
Hence,
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′′
i , u−i)k = φi(α
′′
i ; u
′′
i , u−i)α
′′
i + φi(α
′′
i +1;u
′′
i , u−i)(α
′′
i +1).
By Lemma 4, we have
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k =
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′′
i , u−i)k. This implies
that αi = α
′′
i and φi(αi; u) = φi(α
′′
i ; u
′′
i , u−i). Hence, we have φi(αi; u)u
′′
i (αi)+
φi(αi + 1;u)u
′′
i (αi + 1) = φi(α
′′
i ; u
′′
i , u−i)u
′′
i (α
′′
i ) + φi(α
′′
i + 1;u
′′
i , u−i)u
′′
i (α
′′
i +
1). Therefore, we have φi(α
′
i; u
′
i, u−i)u
′′
i (α
′
i) +φi(α
′
i + 1;u
′
i, u−i)u
′′
i (α
′
i + 1) >
φi(α
′′
i ; u
′′
i , u−i)u
′′
i (α
′′
i ) + φi(α
′′
i + 1;u
′′
i , u−i)u
′′
i (α
′′
i + 1). This gives us that∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
i, u−i)u
′′
i (k) >
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′′
i , u−i)u
′′
i (k).
In both cases, we obtain a contradiction to strategy-proofness. 
Proof of the Theorem. The randomized uniform rule obviously satisfies equal
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probability for the best. Since it satisfies same-sidedness and property B,
Lemma 3 implies that it satisfies Pareto optimality. An argument similar to
Sprumont (1991) can be used to show strategy-proofness.
Let φ be a randomized rule satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto opti-
mality, and equal probability for the best. Suppose the contrary. Then,
φ(u) violates (i) and (ii) of Definition 1 for some u ∈ Un. Hence, we have
(φ1(u), . . . , φn(u)) 	= (Φ1(u), . . . ,Φn(u)), or equivalently there exists some
agent h ∈ N such that φh(u) 	= Φh(u). This implies that
∑
k∈C φh(k; u)k 	=∑
k∈C Φh(k; u)k since each of
∑
k∈C φh(k; u)k and
∑
k∈C Φh(k; u)k is obtained
as a convex combination of two integers by property B and Definition 1 re-
spectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that
∑
j∈N p(uj) ≥ X and
p(u1) ≤ · · · ≤ p(un).
Suppose u = (un, . . . , un). Note that
∑
i∈N p(ui) = n · p(un). By prop-
erty B, for any agent i ∈ N , there exists αi ∈ C with φi(αi + 1;u) > 0
such that φi(αi; u) + φi(αi + 1;u) = 1. From same-sidedness, we have
p(un) = p(ui) ≥ αi + 1 > αi for all i ∈ N . Hence, the best for agent i
is αi + 1. Therefore, equal probability for the best gives us that for any
i, j ∈ N,αi = αj, φi(αi; u) = φj(αj ; u), and φi(αi + 1;u) = φj(αj + 1;u).
Hence,
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k = φi(αi; u)αi + φi(αi + 1;u)(αi + 1) = φj(αj; u)αj +
φj(αj + 1;u)(αj + 1) =
∑
k∈C φj(k; u)k for any i, j ∈ N . This implies that∑
k∈C φh(k; u)k = X/n from feasibility. On the other hand, the expected
value of the marginal distribution induced from the randomized uniform rule∑
k∈C Φi(k; u)k is equal to (λ−µ)(µ+1)+(1−λ+µ)µ = λ for all i ∈ N when∑
i∈N p(ui) > X. When
∑
j∈N p(uj) = X, any agent i ∈ N receives p(un) =
λ with probability 1. Hence, feasibility implies that
∑
k∈C Φh(k; u)k = X/n.
These contradict
∑
k∈C φh(k; u)k 	=
∑
k∈C Φh(k; u)k. If u 	= (un, . . . , un), we
proceed as follows.
Step 1. Since
∑
k∈C φh(k; u)k 	=
∑
k∈C Φh(k; u)k, there exists m ∈ N (per-
haps m = h) such that
∑
k∈C φm(k; u)k >
∑
k∈C Φm(k; u)k (otherwise, we
have
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k ≤
∑
k∈C Φi(k; u)k for all i ∈ N . If
∑
k∈C φh(k; u)k >∑
k∈C Φh(k; u)k, then we have a contradiction. If
∑
k∈C φh(k; u)k <
∑
k∈C Φh(k; u)k,
then X =
∑
i=h
∑
k∈C φi(k; u)k +
∑
k∈C φh(k; u)k <
∑
i=h
∑
k∈C Φi(k; u)k +∑
k∈C Φh(k; u)k = X from feasibility, which is a contradiction). Same-
sidedness implies that p(um) ≥
∑
k∈C φm(k; u)k. Let u
′
m ≡ un. Note
that p(u′m) = p(un) ≥ p(um) and
∑
i=m p(ui) + p(u
′
m) ≥
∑
i∈N p(ui) ≥
X. By Lemma 4, p(u′m) ≥ p(um) implies that
∑
k∈C φm(k; u
′
m, u−m)k ≥∑
k∈C φm(k; u)k. By Definition 1,
∑
k∈C Φm(k; u
′
m, u−m)k =
∑
k∈C Φm(k; u)k.
This is because agent m obtains not his/her own peak with certainty but µ
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and µ + 1 with the common probabilities when his/her utility function is
um since p(um) ≥
∑
k∈C φm(k; u)k >
∑
k∈C Φm(k; u)k. Altogether, we have∑
k∈C φm(k; u
′
m, u−m)k >
∑
k∈C Φm(k; u
′
m, u−m)k.
Suppose (u′m, u−m) = (un, . . . , un). Note that
∑
i=m p(ui) + p(u
′
m) =
n · p(un). By property B, for all i ∈ N there exists α′i ∈ C with φi(α′i +
1;u′m, u−m) > 0 such that φi(α
′
i; u
′
m, u−m) + φi(α
′
i + 1;u
′
m, u−m) = 1. Since∑
i=m p(ui) + p(u
′
m) ≥ X, same-sidedness implies that p(ui) ≥ α′i + 1 > α′i
for all i 	= m and p(u′m) ≥ α′m +1 > α′m. Hence, the best for agent i is α′i +1.
Therefore, equal probability for the best gives us that for any i, j ∈ N,α′i =
α′j, φi(α
′
i; u
′
m, u−m) = φj(α
′
j; u
′
m, u−m), and φi(α
′
i + 1;u
′
m, u−m) = φj(α
′
j +
1;u′m, u−m). Hence, we have
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
m, u−m)k = φi(α
′
i; u
′
m, u−m)α
′
i +
φi(α
′
i+1;u
′
m, u−m)(α
′
i+1) = φj(α
′
j; u
′
m, u−m)α
′
j+φj(α
′
j+1;u
′
m, u−m)(α
′
j+1) =∑
k∈C φj(k; u
′
m, u−m)k for any i, j ∈ N . This implies that
∑
k∈C φm(k; u
′
m, u−m)k =
X/n from feasibility. On the other hand, the expected value of the marginal
distribution induced from the randomized uniform rule
∑
k∈C Φi(k; u
′
m, u−m)k
is equal to (λ′ − µ′)(µ′ + 1) + (1 − λ′ + µ′)µ′ = λ′ for all i ∈ N when∑
i=m p(ui) + p(u
′
m) > X. When
∑
i=m p(ui) + p(u
′
m) = X, any agent
i ∈ N receives p(un) = λ′ with probability 1. Hence, feasibility implies that∑
k∈C Φm(k; u
′
m, u−m)k = X/n. These contradict
∑
k∈C φm(k; u
′
m, u−m)k >∑
k∈C Φm(k; u
′
m, u−m)k. If (u
′
m, u−m) 	= (un, . . . , un), we proceed to Step 2.
Step 2. Since u′m = un, equal probability for the best gives us α
′
m =
α′n, φm(α
′
m; u
′
m, u−m) = φn(α
′
n; u
′
m, u−m), and φm(α
′
m+1;u
′
m, u−m) = φn(α
′
n+
1;u′m, u−m). Hence, we have
∑
k∈C φm(k; u
′
m, u−m)k =
∑
k∈C φn(k; u
′
m, u−m)k.
Definition 1 gives us that
∑
k∈C Φm(k; u
′
m, u−m)k =
∑
k∈C Φn(k; u
′
m, u−m)k.
Hence, we have
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
m, u−m)k >
∑
k∈C Φi(k; u
′
m, u−m)k for i = m, n
(perhaps m = n), which gives us that there exists l 	= m, n such that∑
k∈C φl(k; u
′
m, u−m)k <
∑
k∈C Φl(k; u
′
m, u−m)k. (otherwise, we have that∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
m, u−m)k ≥
∑
k∈C Φi(k; u
′
m, u−m)k for all i ∈ N . Then, we
have X =
∑
i=m,n
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
m, u−m)k +
∑
i=m,n
∑
k∈C φi(k; u
′
m, u−m)k >∑
i=m,n
∑
k∈C Φi(k; u
′
m, u−m)k+
∑
i=m,n
∑
k∈C Φi(k; u
′
m, u−m)k = X from fea-
sibility, which is a contradiction). Definition 1 gives us
∑
k∈C Φl(k; u
′
m, u−m)k ≤
p(ul). Let u
′
l ≡ un. Note that p(u′l) = p(un) ≥ p(ul) and
∑
i=m,l p(ui) +
p(u′m)+p(u
′
l) ≥
∑
i∈N p(ui) ≥ X. By Lemma 5, p(ul) >
∑
k∈C φl(k; u
′
m, u−m)k
and p(u′l) >
∑
k∈C φl(k; u
′
m, u−m)k imply that
∑
k∈C φl(k; u
′
m, u
′
l, u−m,l)k =∑
k∈C φl(k; u
′
m, u−m)k. By Definition 1, we have
∑
k∈C Φl(k; u
′
m, u
′
l, u−m,l)k ≥∑
k∈C Φl(k; u
′
m, u−m)k. Hence, we have that
∑
k∈C φl(k; u
′
m, u
′
l, u−m,l)k <∑
k∈C Φl(k; u
′
m, u
′
l, u−m,l)k.
Suppose (u′m, u
′
l, u−m,l) = (un, . . . , un). Then, the same argument as the
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latter part of Step 1 leads to a contradiction. If (u′m, u
′
l, u−m,l) 	= (un, . . . , un),
we apply Step 1 to the utility profile (u′m, u
′
l, u−m,l).
At each step, we replace the utility function of an agent by un. Since n
is finite, such replacements lead to a contradiction. 
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